Abstract:
Crossing critical climate tipping points can trigger large-scale ecological collapse with severe consequences. Mitigating such an outcome requires coordinated efforts from global stakeholders, such as countries, major corporations, and cities. Yet achieving such cooperation is hindered by short-sighted incentives. Moreover, an individual's willingness to contribute is complicated by uncertainty about others’ responses and limited awareness of ecosystem dynamics. Despite a growing body of research on this global collective action problem, the role of information in shaping outcomes remains poorly understood. In this thesis, I implement a game-theoretic framework to systematically evaluate how access to social and ecological cues shapes long-term cooperation under the threat of ecological collapse. I find that ecological information is essential for sustaining cooperation, whereas social information alone is largely ineffective in the settings examined. However, adding social transparency alongside ecological awareness can be double-edged: it can either promote or hinder cooperation, depending on the context. This study advances the theoretical understanding of how various forms of information influence cooperative behaviour under climate risk
