dc.contributor.author |
WATVE, MILIND |
en_US |
dc.contributor.author |
Damle, Anuja |
en_US |
dc.contributor.author |
Ganguly, Bratati |
en_US |
dc.contributor.author |
Kale, Anagha |
en_US |
dc.contributor.author |
DAHANUKAR, NEELESH |
en_US |
dc.date.accessioned |
2019-02-14T06:46:10Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2019-02-14T06:46:10Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
2011-11 |
en_US |
dc.identifier.citation |
BMC Evolutionary Biology, 11, 345. |
en_US |
dc.identifier.issn |
1471-2148 |
en_US |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://dr.iiserpune.ac.in:8080/xmlui/handle/123456789/1862 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2148-11-345 |
en_US |
dc.description.abstract |
The human mating system is characterized by bi-parental care and faithful monogamy is highly valued in most cultures. Marriage has evolved as a social institution and punishment for extra pair mating (EPM) or adultery is common. However, similar to other species with bi-parental care, both males and females frequently indulge in EPM in secrecy since it confers certain gender specific genetic benefits. Stability of faithful monogamy is therefore a conundrum. We model human mating system using game theory framework to study the effects of factors that can stabilize or destabilize faithful committed monogamy. |
en_US |
dc.language.iso |
en |
en_US |
dc.publisher |
BioMed Central Ltd |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Payoff |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Pure Strategy |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Replicator Dynamic |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Evolutionary Stable Strategy |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Adaptive Dynamic |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Blackmailing |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Human mating system |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Bi-parental care |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Faithful monogamy |
en_US |
dc.subject |
2011 |
en_US |
dc.title |
Blackmailing: the keystone in the human mating system |
en_US |
dc.type |
Article |
en_US |
dc.contributor.department |
Dept. of Biology |
en_US |
dc.identifier.sourcetitle |
BMC Evolutionary Biology |
en_US |
dc.publication.originofpublisher |
Foreign |
en_US |