Combining payment for crop damages and reward for productivity to address wildlife conflict

Abstract

Conflict caused by wild herbivores damaging crops is an almost universal problem in conservation. We designed and implemented a game†theory†based system for supporting farmers whose crops were being heavily damaged by wild herbivores. In this community†operated system, farmers self†report their production, which is endorsed by neighboring farmers. The average deficit in production is compensated for by a payment that is directly proportional to the average deficit in production of the group and to the individual farmer's productivity. As a result, farmers are compensated for the average damage (support) and rewarded for individual productivity (reward) (i.e., support cum reward [SuR]). The design of the game is such that only honest reporting gives maximum returns. Farmers who underreport receive less payment because the SuR amount is proportionate to their self†reported productivity. The endorsing farmers, in their own self†interest, prevent overreporting. The system involves multiple game situations, the combined result of which is a stable strategy based on honesty and hard work. In 2 villages along the western boundary of Tadoba Andhari Tiger Reserve in central India, we tested the system with 75 farmers over 6 crop seasons. After a few initial attempts to cheat, honesty prevailed throughout the group. Average crop productivity increased 2.5†fold, in spite of damage, owing to increased effort by farmers. Apart from wildlife conflict resolution, the model offers a promising alternative to crop insurance and a potential behavioral green revolution in agriculture.